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(Received 12 February 1987) 
Abstract-Mexico's current crisis has its origins in a number of structural conditions that developed in 
the 1970s. This paper examines one of these structural impediments, the country's fiscal disequilibrium. 
An empirical analysis of the country's tax structure indicates that there is ample scope for major tax 
reforms geared to introducing more responsiveness into the country's tax collection system. Given that 
the government will have to reduce its budget deficit to comply with IMF stabilization requirements, the 
analysis indicates tax reform rather than expenditure reduction would be the most efficient policy in 
achieving this objective. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the Mexican government's deficit had been 
increasing over the years without much academic or 
popular discussion, the mid-1970s saw the country's 
fiscal problems emerging as the central focus of the 
debatet over: (1) the causes of the country's economic 
· slowdown, and (2) its increasing tendency toward 
internal and external disequilibrium. 
Increases in oil revenues have not alleviated the 
situation, for the Mexican economy sustained its 
most severe downturn since World War II.in the early 
1980st and the country's public sector deficit in-
creased to a record level§-both in dollar magnitude 
and, more importantly, in relation to the overall 
volume of economic activity.~ 
The following sections examine several key issues 
surrounding the country's fiscal disequilibrium, to-
gether with empirical estimates of the structure and 
responsiveness of the government's tax and revenue 
system. 
MAJOR ECONOMIC-FISCAL TRENDS 
Between 1940 and 1966 Mexico enjoyed a remark-
able rate of almost continuous economic expansion 
with price stability. Balanced growth took place 
between industry and agriculture. The specific fea-
tures of the period included: 
1. a modest growth in personal consumption (due 
to a slow but steady rise in average real wage rates 
as labor shifted from agriculture to industry); 
2. export growth was slow and import growth was 
checked by trade barriers and import substitution; 
3. federal government income (taxes) kept pace 
with the growth of GNP, but was exceeded by the 
growth in expenditures (which followed a six year 
presidential cycle); 
4. inflation was contained through rationing credit 
and manipulation of reserve requirements (to absorb 
the proportion of private savings from the banking 
system); 
5. funds mobilized by the banking system were 
used to finance the public sector deficit. Because the 
effective interest rate far exceeded the actual one, the 
tL. Solis. A Monetary Will-0'-the-Wisp: Pursuit of Equity private sector was motivated to tap sources of exter-
Through Deficit Spending~ Discussion Paper No. 177 nal capital; 
(1977), Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton; E. V. K. 6. continued state support to the private sector was 
Fitzgerald. The Fiscal Crisis of the Latin American necessary to sustain capitalist expansion (Fitzgerald). 
State. In J. F. J. Toyeed, Taxation and Economic The 1967-1976 period has seen a shift in economic 
Development. Frank Cass, London (1978); Clark Rey- relationships reflected by: 
nolds. Why Mexico's Stabilizing Development• Was 
Actually Destabilizing (with Some Implications for the 1. the GDP growth rate slowing to one-half of its 
Future). World Development (September 1978); C. Tello. previous (6%) trend; 
La Politica Economica en Mexico. Siglo XXI, Mexico 2. imports of food and industrial products in-
City (1979); E. V. K. Fitzgerald. Stabilization Policy in creasing rapidly; 
Mexico: The Fiscal Deficit and Macro-economic Equi- 3. failure of the capital goods sector to develop and 
librium, 1960-1977. In Rosemary Thorp and Laurence become integrated into the economy; 
Whitehead, eds, Inflation and Stabilization in Latin 4. an increase in inflation; America. Holmer & Meier, New York ( 1979), pp. 23-64. 
tWilliam Chislett. Bitter Dose of Austerity, Financial Times 5. a shift from productive investment into real 
(November 2, 1982) p. 17. estate and other speculative investment made 
§Wharton, EF A, Mexico various reports. profitable by inflation; 
~The Wharton forecasts appear to be the first to identify 6. a response by the government largely character-
many of the country's oil related development problems. ized by increased intervention including the imposi-
cf. Abel Beltran de! Rio The Mexican Oil Syndrome: tion of closer controls over the activities of multi-
Early Symptoms, Preventive Efforts and Prognosis. In national enterprises. 
Werner Baer and Malcolm Gillis, eds, Export 
Diversification and the New Protectionism. University of Major developments since 1976 have continued 
Illinois Press, Champaign, Illinois (1981), pp. 115-130. these trends with emphasis on: 
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Table I. Mexico: trends in major macro-economic aggregates, 1951-1981 
(percent of GDP) 
1951 1960 1970 
Private consumption 84.9 79.5 71.8 
Private investment 8.1 10.0 12.3 
Private expenditures 93.0 89.5 84.1 
Government consumption 4.2 5.1 7.8 
Government investment 4.9 4.9 7.3 
Government expenditures 9.1 10.0 15.1 
Private savings 9.1 13.0 16.0 
Government savings 0.9 1.4 3.2 
Total savings 10.0 14.4 19.2 
Government current revenue 5.1 4.7 8.3 
Government deficit 4.0 5.3 6.8 
Total investment 13.0 16.7 22.4 
Total consumption 89.1 84.6 79.6 
Resource = external gap 3.0 2.4 3.2 
Private savings-private investment 1.0 3.0 3.7 
Public savings-public investment -4.0 -3.5 -4.1 
Net private-government 
savings-investment gap -3.0 -0.5 -0.4 
Source: Banco De Mexico, lnforme Annual, various issues. 
l. increased oil exploration and the development of 
petrochemicals and fertilizers on a large scale; 
2. the extension of infrastructure in the agriculture 
sector to stimulate production; 
3. the development and expansion of the capital 
goods sector through state finance and direct state 
ventures; 
4. the expansion of expanding urban services; 
5. the state assuming responsibility for an in-
creasing number of productive but not necessarily 
profitable branches of the economy; 
6. public investment continuing to contribute to 
private profitability through absorbing the costs of 
social investment (as well as social consumption) to 
improve the conditions of the urban workforce; 
7. the previous strategy of long term state support 
to the agricultural and export sector was altered in 
favor of short term profit supporting activities such 
as cheap steel and electricity; 
8. the continued maintenance of relatively low 
welfare and military expenditures; 
9. an expanded set of programs in primary and 
secondary education; 
tE. V. K. Fitzgerald. The New International Division of 
Labour and the Relative Autonomy of the State: Notes 
for a Reappraisal of Classical Dependency. Bulletin of 
Latin American Research (October 1981), pp. l-12. See 
also E. V. K. Fitzgerald. A Note on State Capital and 
Industrialization in Mexico. In Jean Carriere, ed., 
Industrialization and the State in Latin America. 
CEDLA, Amsterdam (1979), pp. 49-72. 
tE. V. K. Fitzgerald. Some Aspects of the Political 
Economy of the Latin American State. Development and 
Change (1976). 
§E. V. K. Fitzgerald. The State and Capital Accumulation 
in Mexico. J. Latin Am. Studies (1978), p. 263. 
~An excellent comparative analysis is given in Vito Tanzi. 
Disequilibrium in the Fiscal Sector of Developing 
Countries. Paper presented at the 1981 American Eco-
nomic Association Meetings, Washington, D.C., Dec. 
28-30 (1981). 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
68.7 68.1 66.3 66.0 64.4 62.0 62.0 
11.9 12.2 8.9 11.3 11.7 13.0 13.6 
80.6 80.6 75.2 77.3 76.1 75.0 75.6 
10.3 11.0 10.8 10.9 10.9 10.8 10.8 
9.5 8.8 8.9 9.8 10.8 I I.I 11.6 
19.8 19.8 19.7 20.7 21.7 21.9 22.4 
19.8 18.3 19.7 18.5 18.6 21.2 22.3 
-0.5 0.5 0.9 2.3 3.6 3.3 1.9 
19.3 18.8 20.6 20.8 22.2 24.4 24.5 
7.6 10.3 8.5 10.7 7.8 10.1 9.7 
12.2 9.6 11.2 10.0 13.9 11.8 12.7 
23.7 22.3 22.8 23.6 25.9 28.1 28.2 
79.0 79.1 77.1 76.9 75.3 17.4 72.8 
4.4 3.5 2.2 2.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 
7.9 6.1 10.!( 7.2 6.9 8.2 8.9 
-10.0 -8.3 -8.0 -7.5 -7.2 -7.8 -9.7 
-2.1 -2.2 2.8 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.8 
IO. a rapidly expanding foreign debt facilitated by 
the credit worthiness provided by oil production; 
11. a major financial and exchange rate collapse 
brought on by a slowing down of oil revenues in light 
of over-extended government expenditures. · 
In sum the economic activities of the government 
have played a pivotal role in the country's changing 
development pattern and must be acknowledged as 
performing a critical role in the remarkably rapid 
process of expansion experienced by Mexico in the 
period since World War II. As Fitzgerald notes, the 
growth of the public sector in the Mexican economy 
must also be seen as a source of the imbalance that 
has emerged over the last 20 yr or scr-an imbalance 
that itself led to an accelerated growth of the public 
sector. t State intervention in the process of capital 
accumulation during the period of import substi-
tuting industrialization is common to the experience 
of Latin America as a whole,t but in Mexico the scale 
and scope of this intervention appear to have been 
greater than elsewhere, generating an important de-
bate over the size of the Mexican public sector.§ 
Of critical importance for the issues at hand are the 
changing trends associated with the government's 
fiscal position and the savings effort of the private 
sector. These patterns are examined below. 
SAVINGS 
Mexico's overall national savings performance 
compares favorably to many countries at a similar 
stage of development.~ Since 1970 Mexico's national 
savings have averaged around 19-24% of GDP, a 
fairly high savings level by international standards. 
On the other hand, even during the post-petroleum 
period, the share of public savings has not increased 
markedly. Real public savings declined from a peak 
of 3.2% of GDP in 1970 to -0.5% in 1975, rising to 
3.6% in 1979, only to fall again to l.9% in 1981. 
In spite of the poor public savings performance, 
public investment has grown at a markedly higher 
Table 2. Mexico: federal government revenue, 1950--1981 
(billions of Pesos) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Current revenue 3.4 4.8 5.9 4.8 6.4 7.8 8.6 8.7 9.6 10.3 
Income tax 0.8 1.2 1.4 I.I 1.3 2.0 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.1 
Tax on production and trade 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 I.I 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Sales tax 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Import duties 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 I.I 1.6 1.7 
Export duties 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.6 1.4 I.I I.I 1.2 
Other taxes 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 ., 
Non-fiscal revenue 0.5 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.6 1.0 I.I 1.3 1.2 1.1 ' 
" Capital revenue - - - - - 0.1 1.6 1.0 2.2 0.1 
Financing 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.4 3.8 
Internal 0.08 O.D3 0.2 0.09 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.4 
External 0.10 0.08 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.9 2.4 
Income of state companies 
Total revenue 3.6 4.9 6.3 5.0 7.7 9.0 10.2 10.9 13.2 14.2 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Current revenue 11.2 11.8 13.2 15.0 18.0 18.4 22.3 26.2 31.1 35.7 
Income tax 3.6 4.1 4.7 5.5 7.3 6.0 8.6 10.2 12.1 14.0 
Tax on production and trade - 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.5 4.0 5.2 5.6 a:: . 
"' Sales tax 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.4 3.9 g. 
Import duties 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.7 3.4 3.6 5.0 4.5 5.2 0 
Export duties 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 ,,; 
Other taxes 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.9 1.9 2.1 ::ti 
Non-fiscal revenue 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.7 ~ a 
Capital revenue 1.8 0.5 0.8 0.8 I.I 3.6 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.4 ,., 
Financing 6.5 7.6 6.4 3.9 9.9 13.8 8.8 13.1 10.9 12.7 !:!. f!l. 
Internal 3.0 3.6 4.5 2.6 4.6 14.5 7.0 6.8 7.2 7.8 
"' 
External 3.6 4.0 1.9 1.3 5.3 -0.8 1.8 6.2 3.7 5.0 
Income of state companies - - - - - 28.5 33.4 38.9 42.4 48.7 
Total revenues 19.5 19.9 20.4 19.7 29.0 64.3 66.6 79.4 85.3 97.5 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Current revenue 40.5 43.7 53.6 67.6 93.2 131.2 160.9 228.9 302.2 414.6 677.8 736.l 
Income tax 15.9 16.9 21.0 26.l 36.4 49.2 66.0 93.4 132.2 173.0 248.2 257.7 
Tax on production and trade 6.8 8.9 11.8 12.0 18.l 30.6 31.3 47.9 56.4 68.l 63.4 45.9 
Sales tax 4.4 4.9 5.5 12.8 18.1 24.0 30.4 40.5 52.7 75.1 116.6 129.3 
Import duties 6.4 5.8 6.5 6.3 8.7 10.5 12.3 10.7 14.8 28.8 45.7 43.0 
Export duties 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.8 2.7 15.5 20.7 35.7 135.9 168.0 
Other taxes 2.6 2.5 2.7 3.2 5.3 6.6 8.1 9.9 13.8 17.6 41.4 52.7 
Non-fiScal revenue 3.9 3.8 5.2 6.0 4.8 7.4 10.1 10.9 11.6 16.3 26.3 39.l 
Capital revenue 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.6 0.9 1.3 2.2 2.9 7.0 1.4 2.0 0.6 
Financing 10.7 10.3 22.3 33.7 47.0 70.5 123.6 85.9 112.4 353.9 393.4 919.5 
Internal 8.6 8.5 19.4 28.8 33.8 53.6 96.7 62.9 82.1 305.5 344.4 870.9 
External 2.2 1.8 2.0 4.9 13.2 16.9 26.8 23.0 30.4 48.4 48.9 48.5 
Income of state companies 57.0 65.7 71.8 102.7 140.5 200.6 241.6 374.5 496.3 521.2 1095.4 831.6 
Total revenue 109.1 120.5 148.4 205.7 281.6 403.6 528.5 692.2 917.9 1291.1 2168.6 2487.8 
Sources: Computed from: Nacional Financiera, La Economia Mexicana en Cifras (Mexico City, 1981); Banamex, Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, various issues. ..., 
VI 
VI 
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rate than private investment over the last decade, 
increasing its share of GDP from 7.3% in 1970 to 
11.6% in 1981. Private investment increased its share 
of GDP from 12.3 to 13.6% during the same period 
(Table 1). 
The gap between public savings and public in-
vestment was financed by large increases in domestic 
and external borrowing and inflation. The balance of 
payments current account deficit increased markedly 
after 1970 reaching a peak of 4.4% of gross domestic 
product in 1975 (up from 3.2 in 1970), declining to 
2.2% of GDP in 1977, only to increase again to 3.7% 
by 1981. At the same time the inflation tax (defined 
as the rate of inflation multiplied by the real quantity 
of money, representing the resources money holders 
must spend in order to keep constant the real value 
· of their cash balances) became an important source 
of government financing. It represented 1.6% of 
GDP in 1975, 2.2% of GDP in 1976, peaking at 3.3% 
in 1977. 
The causes of the relative decline in public savings, 
the implications of this trend, the nature and poten-
tial of private savings, and the implications for 
domestic savings of recent past and massive foreign 
borrowings are examined in the sections below. 
FISCAL TRENDS 
The relatively low tax ratio, the large increase in 
general government's consumption expenditures and 
the rapidly deteriorating financial situation of public 
enterprises are the major factors behind the aggra-
vation of the already poor public savings per-
formance in recent years. 
Tax revenues 
The relative decline in overall public sector savings 
has come about in spite of rapidly growing federal 
government revenues, particularly tax revenues (Table 
2) Mexico's development program during the 1950s 
and 1960s emphasizing import substitution policies 
undoubtedly had a negative impact on the generation 
of public resources through tax policy, forcing the 
government to rely increasingly upon the non-tax 
financial sector-private savings and monetizing the 
deficit for financing federal expenditures. t Writing in 
1975 Escobedo noted that "As the public financial 
requirements were increased mainly because of inca-
pacity to increase tax revenues at the same' rate as 
public expenditures ... The Bank of Mexico had to 
tD. Sykes Wilford and Walton Wilford. Fiscal Revenues in 
Mexico: A Measure of Performance, 195(}-1973, Public 
Finance/Finances Publiques (1976), p. 103. 
tGilberto Escobedo. Ahorroy Desarrolo Economico, Bank 
of Mexico, Working Paper (1975), p. 73. 
§cf. John Evans. The Evolution of the Mexican Tax System 
Since 1970, University of Texas, Institute of Latin 
American Studies, Technical Papers Series No. 34 
(1982). . , 
~Pedro Massone. The Mexican Income Tax (1980). Inter-
national Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Bulletin 
(1981), pp. 389-390. 
ttWilford and Wilford. op. cit. 
tolerate greater increases in the money supply."t In 
fact economists writing about the Mexican tax system 
have conveyed the impression that it has been seri-
ously deficient in terms of providing adequate reve-
nue and of achieving desirable non-fiscal objectives, 
such as a more equal income and wealth distribution. 
Although these generalizations contain a large mea-
sure of truth, they tend to mask the cumulative effects 
of the changes which have occurred over the year. 
Given the stable structure of the Mexican political 
system, it is easy to agree with the observation that 
"in Mexico there are no reforms of the tax system 
only changes." Nevertheless the structure of the tax 
system is substantially different from what it was in 
1970. Furthermore, although double digit inflation 
appears to have become a persistent problem, leading 
to the impression that the tax system is failing to 
generate sufficient revenues, the revenues of the pub-
lic sector are now (1981) much greater relative to 
GDP (9.7 vs 12.6%) than in 1970, despite the fact 
that the inflation rate at the time was much lower. 
Since 1970 the tax system has evolved in the direction 
of greater equity, as that term is generally employed 
in taxation, and it is also apparent that the harmony 
of the tax system with economic development has 
greatly improved.§ 
Mexico's tax ratio has averaged around 11-13% of 
GDP since 1975 (Table 3). Several factors have 
contributed to keeping it at this level: (l) the in-
equality in the distribution in income, and (2) the very 
low ratio of imports to GDP (less than 10% ). The 
government has made significant efforts to increase 
the tax ratio and succeeded in achieving marginal 
rates of 25% on average for the period 1972-1981.'lf 
It was anticipated that oil exports would increase the 
ratio to around 17% by the mid-1980s, but this target 
has been revised significantly downward in light of 
the worldwide oil glut. 
Elasticity of the revenue system 
One way to evaluate the performance of Mexico's 
fiscal system is through an examination of the ability 
of the tax structure to generate proportionately 
higher revenues, both through discretionary action 
(tax rate and base changes, legislative action, im-
provement in collection techniques, and the like) as 
well as through revenue growth that is automatically 
marshalled with rising economic activity. In their 
study of Mexico's revenue system, Wilford and Wil-
ford termed this measure "the revenue performance 
criterion" broadly defined as "the ability of the 
country's revenue structure to generate, from what-
ever sources increased government revenues for cur-
rent and capital expenditures during the process of 
economic growth."tt 
Along these lines it is clear that the pressure for 
increased revenues to finance GNP elastic demands 
for social goods and services requires that revenues 
increase at a higher rate than the growth in GDP. 
More specifically, the overall revenue GDP elasticity 
coefficient for a revenue structure must be elastic; i.e. 
the percentage change in revenue divided by the 
percent change in GDP must be greater than one. 
The advantage of the elasticity type measure in a 
country such as Mexico, where relatively little is 
Table 3. Mexico: trends in federal government revenue, 1951-1981 
(percentages) 
1951 1960 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
(Percent of total revenue) 
Current revenue 94.4 57.4 37.I 32.5 30.4 33.1 32.9 32.I 31.3 29.6 
Income tax (22.2) (18.5) (14.6) (12.2) (12.5) (13.5) (14.4) (13.4) (11.4) (10.4) 
Tax on production and trade (13.9) (8.7) (6.2) (7.6) (5.9) (6.9) (6.1) (5.3) (2.9) (1.8) 
Sales tax (I I.I) (5.6) (4.0) (5.9) (5.8) (5.9) (5.7) (5.8) (5.4) (5.2) 
Import duties (13.9) (10.3) (5.9) (2.6) (2.3) (1.5) (1.6) (2.2) (2.1) (1.7) 
Export duties (13.9) (5.6) (0.9) (0.7) (0.5) (2.2) (2.3) (2.8) (6.3) (6.8) 
Other taxes (5.6) (-) (2.4) (1.6) (1.5) (1.4) (1.5) (1.4) (1.9) (2.1) 
Non-fiscal revenue (13.9) (8.7) (3.6) (1.8) (1.9) (1.6) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.6) 
Capital revenue - 9.2 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Financing 5.6 33.3 9.8 17.5 23.4 12.4 12.2 27.4 18.1 37.0 
Internal (2.2) (15.4) (7.9) (13.3) (18.3) (9.1) (8.9) - {23.7) (15.9) (35.0) 
External (2.8) (18.5) (2.0) (4.2) (5.1) (3.3) (3.3) (3.7) (2.3) (1.9) 
Income of state companies - - 52.2 49.7 45.7 54.I 54.I 40.4 50.5 33.4 
Total revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Percent of GDP) 
Current revenue 9.1 7.2 9.7 11.9 11.7 12.4 12.9 13.5 15.8 12.6 
Capital revenue - 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Borrowing 0.4 4.2 2.6 6.4 9.0 4.6 4.8 11.5 9.2 15.7 ~ Income of state-companies - - 13.6 18.2 17.6 20.3 21.2 17.0 25.6 14.2 




Table 4. Mexico: government revenue, expenditure elasticity, 1951-1981 ~ ~ 
Statistics (") 
:::!. 
Elasticity T-statistics RHO T-statistic ,2 F DW ~-
"' 
Current revenue 1.15 (32.37) 0.71 (5.54) 0.974 1048.21 2.10 
Income taxes 1.22 (38.94) 0.48 (3.02) 0.982 1516.90 1.64 
Tax on production and trade 0.42 (1.84) 0.95 (17.21) 0.108 3.39 1.50 
Sales tax 1.35 (29.01) 0.64 (4.52) 0.967 841.41 1.90 
Import duties 0.89 (17.34) 0.58 (3.93) 0.915 300.87 1.79 
Export duties 2.33 5.46 0.95 (16.92) 0.516 29.87 2.49 
Other taxes 1.28 (6.61) 0.34 (2.00) ~.610 43.82 2.27 
Non-fiscal revenue 0.78 (21.74) - - 0.944 472.9 1.67 
Capital revenue 0.26 (2.37) - - 0.167 5.62 1.93 
Financing 1.52 (15.71) 0.36 (2.21) 0.898 246.83 2.18 
Internal 1.71 (13.49) 0.42 (2.57) 0.866 182.03 2.08 
External 1.18 (8.83) - - 0.736 78.02 2.04 
Income of state companies (1965--1981) 1.19 (63.78) -0.90 (-8.15) 0.996 4067.91 0.93 
Total revenue 1.34 (15.26) 0.78 (6.89) 0.893 232.88 1.92 
Government investment 1.21 (35.41) 0.54 (3.57) 0.978 1254.35 2.08 
Public sector budget 1.30 (13.54) 0.81 7!59 0.863 183.36 1.98 
Government consumption 1.00 (10.86) 0.95 (16.77) 0.813 118.01 1.95 
Government expenditure 1.19 (25.54) 0.78 (6.82) 0.959 652.35 2.05 
Government revenue 
(National income accounts) 1.14 (25.68) 0.38 (2.25) 0.929 659.8 2.01 w 
Note: Estimations of form: I 09 Y = a + b log GDP where Y = measure of revenue, expenditure. 
VI 
...... 
Estimations by ordinary least squares, Time Series Processor Version 3.5, Cochrane>--Orcutt technique. 
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Table 5. Mexico: government revenue, expenditure elasticity, 1951-1981 
Statistics 
Elasticity T-statistics RHO T-statistic ,2 F DW 
Current revenue 1.18 (58.59) 0.994 3433.72 1.70 
Income taxes 1.17 (26.11) 0.51 (2.68) 0.972 682.16 1.91 
Tax on production and trade 
Sales tax 1.31 (16.53) 0.66 (4.08) 0.935 273.39 1.94 
Import duties 0.831 (11.64) 
Export duties 2.15 (5.58) 0.88 (8.50) 0.621 31.23 2.58 
Other taxes 1.42 (10.57) 0.854 111.75 2.22 
Non-fiscal revenue 0.86 (21.75) 0.961 473.26 1.77 
Capital revenue 0.19 (1.02) 0.051 1.04 1.65 
Financing 1.38 (16.76) ~ 0.937 280.96 1.94 
Internal 1.47 (17.90) 0.944 320.37 1.90 
External 1.16 (6.06) 0.659 36.74 2.07 
Income of state companies (1965--1981) 1.19 (63.78) -0.90 (-8.15) 0.997 4067.91 0.94 
Total revenue 1.24 (10.81) 0.76 (5.36) 0.861 116.93 1.81 
Government expenditure 1.16 (47.42) 0.38 (1.91) 0.992 2249.29 2.21 
(National income accounts) 
Consumption I.I I (25.81) 0.73 / (4.95) 0.972 666.38 1.93 
Investment 1.16 (51.99) 0.993 2703.88 2.17 
Government revenue 1.08 (19.10) 0.950 364.81 2.17 
(National income accounts) 
Public sector budget 1.21 (9.99) 0.78 (-5.75) 0.840 99.92 1.89 
Note: Estimations of form Y =a + b log GDP where Y =measure of revenue, expenditure. 
Estimations by ordinary least squares, Time Series Processor, Version 3.5, Cochrane-Orcutt technique. 
Table 6. Mexico: government revenue, expenditure elasticity, 1951-1981 
Statistics 
Elasticity T-statistics RHO T-statistic ,2 F DW 
Current revenue 1.16 (52.30) 0.995 2735.81 1.96 
Income taxes 1.08 (23.56) 0.57 (2.75) 0.975 555.46 1.39 
Tax on production and trade 0.31 (1.09) 0.89 (7.91) 0.o78 1.19 1.44 
Sales tax 1.26 (10.72) 0.68 (3.74) 0.891 114.95 2.04 
Import duties 0.77 (10.29) 0.883 105.89 1.70 
Export duties 2.10 (6.95) 0.73 (4.27) 0.776 48.34 2.56 
Other taxes 1.32 (8.01) 0.821 64.22 1.19 
Non-fiscal revenue 0.81 (17.57) 0.954 308.89 1.68 
Capital revenue 0.20 (0.81) 0.045 0.66 1.96 
Financing 1.47 (17.74) 0.954 314.92 1.95 
Internal 1.56 (16.91) I?"' -- 0.953 286.07 2.01 ,--,,,_~·-
External 1.08 (6.90) 0.773 47.62 1.06 
Income of state companies 1.19 (63.78) -0.90 (-8.15) 0.996 4067.91 0.93 
Total revenue 1.22 (96.66) 0.998 6363.34 1.66 
Government expenditures 1.15 (79.77) 0.998 6363.34 1.98 
(National income accounts) 
Consumption 1.10 (23.95) 0.72 (4.81) 0.968 632.41 1.91 
Investment 1.15 (55.68) 0.995 3100.54 2.04 
Government revenue 1.07 (17.63) 0.942 307.91 2.07 
(National income accounts) 
Public sector budget 1.19 (44.88) 0.993 2014.82 1.80 
Note: Estimations by ordinary least squares, Time Series Processor, Version 3.5, Cochrane-Orcutt technique. 
known about the complexity of the tax laws (exemp-
tions, etc.) is that "one need not be concerne"cl about 
the source of the alterations in tax yields (whether 
from national income related or exogenous 
tPast measurements of elasticity have sturred up an on-
going debate over methodological problems associated 
with the underlying data sources. In addition to the 
above cited Wilford and Wilford article, see Arthur J. 
Mann. Mexican Fiscal Revenue and Performance, 
1950-1977: A Revisit. Public Finance/Finances Pub- . 
liques, pp. 378-385 (1978) and D. Sykes Wilford and 
Walton Wilford. Comment on Mexican Fiscal Revenue 
Performance, 1950-1977: A Revisit. Public Finance/ 
Finances Publiques, pp. 134-137 (1979). 
tRoughly similar results were obtained by Wilford and 
Wilford cited above. 
.. 
·influences) but rather the overall ability of the source 
to stimulate proportionately higher revenues with 
economic development regardless of the factors stim-
ulating that growth. Revenue performanr-e can, 
therefore, be measured by the historic responsiveness 
of the taic source as GDP increases. This method, 
therefore, permits evaluation of the government's 
effort to stimulate the development of additional 
resources under conditions of growth and not the 
much narrower measure of the responsiveness of 
yields solely to changes in GDP. 
The elasticityt of the various sources of govern-
ment revenue (Table 2) were estimated by regressing 
their logarithmic value on the logarithm of GDP for 
the period 1951-1981 and also sub-periods 
1960-1981 and 1965-1981. A Cochrane-Orchutt or-
dinary least squares estimation procedure was used in 
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overall system is elastic with the elasticity of current 
revenue not varying much for the different time 
periods i.e. l.15 (1951-1981); 1.18 (1960-1981); and 
1.16 (1965-1981). There does not appear to be a 
marked difference over time in the elasticity of vari-
ous taxes (consistent with the general observation 
that no real significant reforms have been introduced 
in this area during the period under consideration. t 
The elasticity of financing is somewhat above that 
of current revenue, l.52 (1951-1981) versus l.15, 
yielding an elasticity of total revenue of 1.34, also 
considerably above that of current revenue. 
In short, the country's deficit problems cannot be 
attributed exclusively to a deficient (inelastic) tax and 
revenue system, but are clearly the result of an 
expenditure rate-public sector budget elasticity of 1.3 
for 1951-1981, considerably above that of current 
revenues. 
In general, the results indicate that: 
l. the revenue source with the highest elasticity has 
been federal government borrowing; 
2. the revenue structure in Mexico is much less 
income responsive than one would desire for a coun-
try in its stage of development; 
3. as larger shares of the national economy became 
dependent upon government infrastructure ex-
penditures and the need for social goods and services 
expand, the government with or without significantly 
increased oil revenues will be faced with a tax struc-
ture which will finance a decreasing percentage of 
federal outlays; 
4. a revenue structure that relies to such a heavy 
extent (around 20% of income from state companies) 
must ultimately encounter serious conflicts between 
the pricing of public services and the need for addi-
tional revenues; 
5. to date the tendency has been towards mon-
etizing the debt with the resulting inflationary tax 
increasing in importance as a source of funds trans-
ferred to the government. 
In view of the government's resource needs, the 
most important shortcoming of the tax system is its 
inability to generate the required revenues adequate 
to meet the needs of rapidly growing expenditure 
programs, and indeed, much of the increase in reve-
nue which has taken place is due to rate increases 
rather than an inherently elastic tax design. The main 
culprits here are the limited progressivity ·of the 
personal income taxt and excise taxes many of which 
until the introduction of the value-added tax (1980) 
were specific. 
The authorities are aware of the many deficieneies 
of the present tax system and have been working on 
tL. Solis. Economic Policy Reform in Mexico: A Case Study 
for Developing Countries. Pergamon Press, New York 
(1981). 
tMann finds the tax system more or less proportional. See 
Arthur Mann. The Mexican Tax Burden by Family 
Income Class. Public Finance Q. pp. 305-331 (July 
1982). 
§Massone. op. cit. pp. 389-390. 
'l]Other components are given in Arthur Mann, Wagner's 
Law: An Econometric Test for Mexico: 1975--1976. 
National Tax J. pp. 189-201 (1980). 
alternative reform proposals over the past few years. 
The culmination of this effort was the enactment at 
the end of 1980 of several Jaws introducing various 
amendments to direct and indirect taxation. The 
changes cover different tax laws and include the 
following measures.§ 
1. enactment of a new income tax law which 
contains important changes concerning tax jurisdic-
tion, extent of the corporate income tax, taxation of 
business income of individuals and taxation of in-
come of non-residents; 
2. amendments to the value-added tax which in-
clude the introduction of a zero rate for food and for 
some other items which were previously exempt from 
the tax; 
3. introduction of a "Spiral Tax on Production and 
Services" which is an excise tax that replaces previous 
taxes on soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, beer, gas-
oline, processed tobacco, life insurance, and tele-
phone services; and 
4. introduction of other changes concerning the 
Customs Code, customs value, registration of vehi-
cles, the tax on new cars, the tax on hold and use of 
vehicles, the tax on the acquisition of sugar, cacao 
and other goods, the tax on urban unimproved land, 
and some other minor changes. 
These measures are positive modifications o.n the 
existing system. It is quite apparent, however, that 
strong political opposition together with the new 
petroleum riches may render an indepth fiscal reform 
very difficult. The highly necessary reform of the 
special bases seems to be a particularly sensitive issue 
because it would affect strong interest groups; i.e. 
transport construction and agriculture. However, a 
continued strengthening of the administrative process 
and a revision of indirect taxes will probably take 
place. Under the circumstances, this should be con-
sidered a minimum if the government wants to 
achieve its targets. On the positive side, the intro-
duction of the value added tax in 1980 seems to have 
eliminated the inefficiency of the cascade aspects of 
the commercial receipts tax and improved internal 
controls. 
Government expenditures 
Government current expenditures grew at an an-
nual real rate of 14.9% during 1971-1976 while its 
components of consumption, transfer and interest 
payments growing around 12%, 29% and 15% per 
year, respectively, during the same period.~ For the 
period 197~ 1981 the rate of increase in real govern-
ment consumption declined to an average annual rate 
of slightly over 7% with its components growing 
more or less proportionately to their rates in the 
1971-1976 period. For the period as a whole, wages 
and salaries were the fastest growing component of 
consumption expenditures. This was the result of a 
rapid increase in the number of government employ-
ees and a somewhat more moderate increase in real 
wages. The number of public sector employees in-
creased at more than 9% per year during this period 
while real wages and salaries increased at around 4% 
per year. 
Federal government current transfers were the 
fastest growing component of current expenditures 
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during most of this period and thus a major factor 
responsible for the public sector's poor savings per-
formance. The enormous increase of transfers to trust 
funds in general and to agricultural financial entities 
in particular appears to be the main cause of the 
acceleration of extra-system transfers. t 
The emphasis on rationalization and the necessary 
fiscal restraints called upon by the stabilization pro-
gram led to the relatively low growth of government 
consumption during the 1976-1981 period. However, 
the government's commitment to launch an effective 
attack on poverty and to reduce the large gap be-
tween demand and supply of basic needs places 
continuous pressure on the authorities to return to 
the high rates of expenditure characterizing the 
1971-1976 period. 
Private savings 
Private sector savings have not only accounted for 
the great bulk of national savings but have averaged 
around 20% of GDP during the 1975-1981 period. 
On the other hand, only around 10% of these funds 
are actually mobilized through the financial system. 
Little is known about the composition of these 
savings, but the evidence available suggests that a 
corporation's internal cash generation is its major 
componenq The only data readily available on the 
flow of funds of Mexican enterprises are from a 
NAFINSA study of the capital goods industry. Ac-
cording to this report, 30.3% of the financial require-
ments of these enterprises were financed-from internal 
cash generation and equity during 1971-1975, the 
other sources of financing being credit from other 
enterprises (23%), foreign credits (16%), and credit 
from the domestic banking system (16%).§ 
The limited role of domestic credit in financing 
Mexican enterprises simply reflects the relatively 
small share of totiil private savings channelled 
through the nation's financial markets. In addition an 
important share of these funds are short run deposits 
of enterprises. This situation combined with the 
almost complete absence of a securities market and 
other sources of domestic long term financing tends 
to confirm the general belief that most of the private 
sector's investments are financed through internal 
cash generation, probably undistributed profits and 
depreciation allowances. 
tE. V. K. Fitzgerald. Patterns of Public Sector Income and· 
Expenditure in Mexico. Institute of Latin American 
Studies, University of Texas, Technical Papers Series 
No. 17 (1978). 
iE. V. K. Fitzgerald. Patterns of Savings and Investment 
in Mexico: 1939-1976. University of Cambridge, Centre 
of Latin American Studies, Working Papers No. 30 
(1977). 
§NAFINSA-UNIDO. Mexico: Una Estrategia para el 
Desarrollo de la Industria de Bienes de Capital, Tables 
VI-14, p. 342. Mexico City, NAFINSA (1977). 
'l[cf. Gustavo Romero Kolbeck. Public Sector Banking, and 
Federico Carrera Cortez, The Commercial Banking 
System and Investment Opportunities. in John Christ-
man, Business Mexico (Mexico City: American Cham-
ber of Commerce of Mexico, 1981), pp. 105-122. 
tt Based in part on John Rhoads. The Mexican Stock 
Exchange. In John Christman, Business Mexico, op. cit., 
pp. 137-144. 
In large part the development strategy of the 1950s 
and 1960s reinforced these patterns. As noted that 
strategy was based on a combination of high private 
sector profits and government supportive action. The 
former was supported by the protection available to 
industry through quantitative restrictions on imports 
during this period, the extremely favorable tax treat-
ment on income from capital, and the inequality of 
income distribution, these factors contributed to ab-
normally high profit margins which in turn provided 
the major source of private savings. 
It is not at all obvious, however, that given the 
conditions in the 1980s-the increased importance of 
oil revenues together with the need to develop high 
mass markets for industrial goods-that a genuine 
government policy shift in the direction of improved 
income distribution and more efficient industrial 
production would lead to reduced rates of in-
vestment, particularly if a simultaneous effort was 
made by the authorities at developing and strength-
ening the country's financial markets. 
Contrary to common opinion, Mexico's financial 
markets are not highly developed; financial inter-
mediation in Mexico is in fact only slightly above the 
level of the average developing country. Mexico 
underwent a process of fairly rapid financial deep-
ening through 1972 when the ratio of the combined 
assets of financial institutions to GDP reached a level 
somewhat in excess of 50%. Since then, this ratio has 
remained roughly constant. In addition, the volume 
of securities trading has been equal to only one-half 
of the percent of gross domestic product, a fairly low 
ratio for an advanced developing country. 
The Mexican financial system is relatively simple 
and is basically organized around banking type insti-
tutions.~ The securities market is the most under-
developed sector of the Mexican financial market. 
Although securities trading in Mexico has increased 
very rapidly in the last two decades from an almost 
negligible base, the volume of all securities, both 
stocks and bonds, traded on the Mexican stock 
exchange remains quite low. The ratio of the value of 
shares traded to GDP is currently less than one 
percent, compared to ratios of 3% or more in devel-
oping countries where significant securities market 
development has taken place (e.g. Brazil and Korea). 
Several factors are usually cited for the relative 
under-devefopment of the Mexican securities 
market.tt 
I. Until recently, finance companies and mortgage 
banks stood ready to repurchase their long term 
bonds at par, allowing these institutions to pay long 
term bond rates of interest on instruments which were 
basically sight deposits. This practice made private 
long term corporate bonds relatively non-competitive 
instruments. It also imposed a significant liquidity 
risk on these institutions which resulted in serious 
institutional problems in 1976. As a result these 
redeemable bonds have gradually been eliminated, 
thereby removing this obstacle to deeper bond mar-
ket development. 
2. A portion of the interest paid to savers on bank 
deposits (called the sobretasa) is now exempt from 
tax, whereas all interest paid on debt securities is 
taxable. This subsidy to bank deposits, together with 
' 
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an unwillingness by the authorities to authorize pri-
vate short term debt securities, has inhibited the 
growth of a short term securities market. 
3. There is some evidence that the commercial 
banking system regards the development of a debt 
securities market as a competitive threat which would 
reduce the volume of financing conducted through 
the banking system (as well as exert competitive 
pressures on bank profit margins). Bankers have 
acted in the past to impede securities market devel-
opment. The banks also appear to believe that there 
is a high degree of substitutability over the short run 
between debt securities issues and bank deposits and 
that large debt securities offerings could lead to 
disruptive deposit withdrawals. 
4. The main impediments to development of a 
share market are largely institutional. Rates of return 
on Mexican equity capital are high for shares regis-
tered on the stock exchange. However, the unwilling-
ness of closely held firms to open their capital and to 
meet minimum disclosure requirements as well as the 
absence of a strong securities distribution system are 
probably the main impediments to stock exchange 
development. 
The reliance of the Mexican financial market on 
deposit liabilities has made the asset base on which 
domestic investment financing is built a very liquid 
one. The Mexican authorities are concerned about 
the lack of long maturities in the domestic financial 
market and have begun to stress the need for devel-
oping a long term securities market of significant 
~roportions. In 1977 PEMEX began issuing bonds 
(petro bonds) are more recently there have been 
several issues of new floating rate medium term bond 
issues by major private corporations. While these are 
moves in the right direction, the current economic 
crisis is unlikely to halt major developments in the 
area for at least several years. 
LOSS OF INSTRUMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
As L. Solis and G. Ortiz observed,t an important 
consequence of the country's inflationary experience 
(particularly after 1971) has been the loss of 
effectiveness of two of the main instruments of mon-
etary control traditionally used by the Bank of Mex-
ico: (l) changes in commercial bank reserve require-
ments, and (2) .the setting of interest rates payable on 
savings deposits and other financial liabilities. 
Traditionally, the difference between the govern-
ment's deficit and the flow of new foreign debt has 
determined the amount of internal finance required 
by the public sector. Funds have traditionally been 
raised by the Bank of Mexico through the increase in 
tGuillermo Ortiz and L. Solis. Financial Structure and 
Exchange Rate Experience: Mexico 1954-1977. J Dev. 
Econ. (December 1979), pp. 515-548. 
tE. V. K. Fitzgerald. The Fiscal Deficit and Development 
Finance: A Note on the Accumulation Balance in 
Mexico, University of Cambridge, Centre of Latin 
American Studies, Working Papers No. 35, pp. 16-17. 
§Ibid. p. 18. 
,Ibid. p. 17. 
marginal reserve requirements imposed on the banks. 
The reserves mobilized in this manner are used by the 
government for a large part of its expenditures. The 
domestic savings remaining in the banking system are 
then available to finance private sector activities. 
During the stabilizing development period of the 
1960s, the government's deficit fluctuated between 2.0 
and 4.7% of GDP. About half of the deficit was 
financed with foreign savings. As a result the foreign 
debt to GDP ratio increased from 6.8% in 1960 to 
9.8% in 1970. More importantly, the deficit was kept 
within reasonable limits and foreign debt was not 
used excessively. 
Solis feels that it was the possibility of substituting 
domestic for foreign debt that facilitated the use of 
reserve requirements as an effective instrument of 
monetary control during this period. It was only 
when the government's deficit exceeded the avail-
ability of foreign and domestic requirements and the 
excess debt became monetized that the usefulness of 
reserve requirements as a regulating instrument was 
nullified. 
The acceleration of government spending, es-
pecially after 1972, did in fact result in deficits which 
could not be financed with non-inflationary domestic 
resources (although foreign credit was liberally uti-
lized). A good portion of deficits were directly mon-
etized. The monetary base began to grow at .more 
than twice its average 1960 rate. The resulting up-
surge in inflationary pressures produced negative real 
interest rates. Apparently, as the environment be-
came increasingly detrimental to financial savings, 
substitution between domestic and foreign credit 
became increasingly difficult. Reserve requirements 
were than of only limited usefulness as an instrument 
of monetary policy. 
Under those conditions the Solis approach to 
policy would undoubtedly be one of designing new 
monetary instruments and attempting to once again 
gain control over the money supply and thus 
inflation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Mexico's fiscal crisis, according to Fitzgerald,t is 
simply the imbalance created by the acceleration in 
public sector accumulation and the inadequacy of its 
financing. The resulting deficit according to this line 
of thought is a growing public sector borrowing 
requirement which stems largely from the refusal of 
the private sector to accede to higher taxes to pay for 
what are, after all according to Fitzgerald govern-
ment activities designed to maintain and increase the 
profitability of its own activities.§ 
Interestingly enough, Fitzgerald does not seem to 
necessarily advocate tax reform in the country. He is 
obviously less concerned with monetary stability than 
Solis, and seems to feel that with increased oil 
revenues, there will be for practical purposes no real 
savings constraint on investment (either internal or 
external). Following this line or argument "the prob-
lem of accumulation in the Mexican economy of 
the 1980s will not be demand management in the 
traditional sense, but rather the planning of the 
composition of final demand itself and the income 
distribution that underlies it."~ 
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Whatever the merits of this line of argument, the 
central issue between Mexico and the International 
Monetary Fund remains the size of the country's 
public sector deficit which in 1987 is likely to remain 
of 10% of GDP. The Mexican mission to the IMF 
has argued that a major factor behind the country's 
half decade of stability is a high degree of deficit 
spending to meet basic social needs. 
The IMF wou!d like to reduce the budget deficit to 
5% of GDP by the end of the decade. Mexican 
officials on the other hand contend that their target 
is the maximum permissible without causing a major 
economic contraction. In large part the analysis 
above indicates that there is adequate scope for tax 
reform of one sort or another capable of making a 
significant contribution to the IMF's objective. Fi-
nancial reforms would also play a key element in 
enabling the country to solve its current fiscal crisis. 
_ ... ,;;, 
